In his address marking the 11th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2026, President U Min Aung Hlaing outlined the government’s approach to peace, national unity and federalism. He reiterated invitations for peace talks without preconditions, urged the resolution of differences through dialogue, and emphasized respect for minority rights and existing agreements. The following 12 key points highlight the principal statements, proposals and priorities presented in his speech.
The key points from the speech marking the 11th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) are:
1. NCA remains the foundation of the peace process. The President described it as both a ceasefire agreement and a political commitment to resolve armed conflicts through dialogue and build a Union based on democracy and a federal system.
2. Peace talks are open without preconditions. He reiterated the invitation to both NCA signatories and non-signatories, specifically calling on the KNU, CNF and ABSDF to participate.
3. PDF groups were urged to return to the legal fold. He called on them to pursue democratic objectives through non-violent means.
4. Differences should be resolved through negotiation. He urged armed organizations, political parties, civil society organizations and citizens to seek practical, achievable solutions through dialogue.
5. Existing peace commitments should be honoured. He called for continued implementation of the NCA and further efforts to encourage non-signatory ethnic armed organizations to sign.
6. Previous agreements will be taken forward. He said the 43 proposed constitutional amendment points and Parts I, II and III of the Union Accord would be discussed and approved in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and implemented in phases.
7. Federal provisions of the 2008 Constitution will be implemented. He outlined federalism as a constitutional division of executive, legislative and judicial powers, enabling regional and state self-administration.
8. Democracy must respect minority rights and differing views. He emphasized that majority rule should give due regard to minorities and called for avoiding discrimination, personality cults and treating political opponents as enemies.
9. States should represent all their inhabitants. He said states belong collectively to all ethnic communities living within them and urged joint consideration of state names that reflect this diversity.
10. Peace institutions have been reorganized. The central, working and negotiation committees will coordinate the process, with the Working Committee setting timelines and strategies and the Negotiation Committee carrying out implementation.
11. Talks aim ultimately to convene a Peace Conference. He outlined continued informal, formal and bilateral discussions to strengthen ceasefires and prepare for official meetings under the NCA.
12.Peace and development should advance together. He linked lasting peace with rehabilitation, regional development, education, healthcare and livelihoods, presenting these efforts as a responsibility to future generations.
By K. C. Sharma
The international economic order is undergoing significant change. Competition over trade, finance, technology and energy is encouraging developing countries to reassess their external partnerships. Alongside established international institutions, groupings such as BRICS have become increasingly relevant to debates about multipolarity, development finance and the representation of emerging economies in global governance.
For Myanmar, these developments offer opportunities to broaden international cooperation. As the country advances its development priorities, improving access to investment, modernizing infrastructure and securing reliable energy supplies remain important objectives. Closer engagement with BRICS, potentially through partner-country status, could provide an additional avenue for cooperation in finance, technology and energy.
The case for such engagement rests on its potential to broaden Myanmar’s options. Its value would depend on the scope of participation available, the willingness of prospective partners to cooperate and Myanmar’s capacity to translate diplomatic engagement into viable projects. BRICS partnership should therefore be assessed as a possible component of a wider energy-security strategy.
Broadening Financial and Economic Partnerships
Myanmar’s energy priorities are closely linked to the availability of investment. Infrastructure modernization requires sustained financing, while existing sanctions and evolving domestic conditions can influence the pace and scope of engagement by international investors and financial institutions. Broadening financial partnerships could help support the country’s infrastructure and energy development objectives.
Closer cooperation with BRICS countries could help diversify Myanmar’s economic relationships. The development of additional trade, financing and logistics arrangements may reduce dependence on a narrow range of external channels and create opportunities for longer-term partnerships.
Iran’s participation in BRICS illustrates the interest that countries facing Western sanctions have shown in expanding their relationships within the grouping. However, its experience cannot be assumed to offer a directly transferable model for Myanmar. The benefits of engagement would depend on each country’s economic circumstances, institutional arrangements and relationships with other participants.
The New Development Bank (NDB) is relevant to this discussion because of its role in infrastructure and development financing. Myanmar could explore whether closer engagement with BRICS might support future cooperation involving the bank. Such possibilities should remain conditional: partner-country status should not be presented as an automatic entitlement to NDB financing.
Local-currency financing also deserves consideration. Where commercially feasible, it could help diversify settlement arrangements and reduce certain foreign-exchange exposures. Its effectiveness would depend on currency stability, liquidity and the preferences of lenders and suppliers.
Similarly, clearly defined project structures and appropriate dispute-resolution arrangements could improve investment confidence. These mechanisms would require careful design and implementation; they should not be assumed to eliminate political, financial or operational risks.
An Energy Transition Responsive to National Circumstances
A central feature of the BRICS energy approach described in its cooperation framework is the emphasis on transitions that reflect national circumstances and development priorities. For Myanmar, this principle has practical relevance. Energy policy must address immediate electricity shortages while supporting longer-term modernization and decarbonization.
Reliable power is essential to industrial activity, public services and household welfare. Transition policies therefore need to consider affordability, supply continuity and the capacity of the electricity system to accommodate new technologies.
Within this framework, conventional fuels, including coal and gas, may continue to play a role during a phased transition. Their continued use should be evaluated against supply reliability, economic viability, environmental performance and the availability of alternatives.
A gradual approach can give Myanmar time to strengthen its electricity network, develop cleaner generation and improve energy efficiency. However, sequencing should be accompanied by clear objectives so that measures adopted to address immediate shortages support the country’s longer-term development needs.
Closer engagement with BRICS could provide opportunities to exchange experience on these questions. The relevant policy contribution would be greater flexibility in designing an affordable and orderly transition, supported by practical cooperation.
Expanding Access to Energy Technologies
The grouping’s recognition of conventional energy needs exists alongside substantial capabilities in renewable energy and other technologies. Its energy cooperation roadmap identifies opportunities for joint research, investment and technology collaboration.
These capabilities are relevant to Myanmar’s infrastructure requirements. China has a strong position in solar manufacturing, batteries and related supply chains. Russia possesses advanced nuclear technologies, while Brazil has extensive experience in biofuels. Cooperation with these countries could broaden the range of technologies and equipment available for consideration.
Access, however, would depend on specific agreements, financing arrangements and project suitability. Myanmar would need to assess technologies according to their costs, infrastructure requirements, implementation timelines and domestic operating capacity.
For example, solar generation and storage could be considered within plans to improve electricity availability, while biofuel cooperation could be assessed against domestic resource conditions. Nuclear cooperation would require particularly careful evaluation of institutional capacity, financing and long-term operational responsibilities.
The strongest case for technology cooperation lies in matching external expertise to clearly identified national needs. Affordable equipment would be most valuable when accompanied by skills development, maintenance capacity and arrangements that support sustained operation.
Strengthening Supply-Chain Resilience
BRICS brings together major energy exporters and substantial energy-consuming economies. This combination creates a potentially useful setting for dialogue on supply security, investment and energy trade.
For Myanmar, closer relationships within this network could support efforts to diversify suppliers and strengthen access to essential energy resources. Such cooperation may be especially relevant when geopolitical tensions disrupt established supply routes, including those passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Nevertheless, participation in a diplomatic grouping cannot by itself ensure uninterrupted deliveries or protection from international price volatility. Physical supply security depends on the availability of fuel, transport infrastructure, commercial contracts and the resilience of delivery arrangements.
The practical objective should therefore be to develop a broader and more dependable supply network. Cooperation with BRICS countries could contribute to that objective through commercially viable agreements and investment in supporting infrastructure.
Diversification would also require attention to concentration risks. Myanmar’s energy strategy should preserve sufficient flexibility to respond to changing market conditions and the circumstances of individual suppliers.
A Pragmatic Framework for Engagement
Pursuing BRICS partner-country status could be a reasonable step toward expanding Myanmar’s international cooperation. Its potential advantages include stronger energy relationships, wider access to technology and additional opportunities to explore development financing.
Realizing these benefits would require a focused agenda. Myanmar would need to identify priority projects, assess financing terms and establish credible arrangements for implementation. Domestic stability and the capacity to manage infrastructure investments would remain central to the success of external cooperation.
Engagement with BRICS could also form part of a broader approach that maintains constructive relationships with regional partners and other development institutions. A diversified diplomatic and economic strategy would give Myanmar greater room to pursue arrangements suited to its needs.
The strongest argument for BRICS partnership is its potential to expand practical choices at a time of significant energy and financial pressure. With realistic expectations, carefully selected projects and sustained implementation, closer engagement could contribute to a more resilient energy system and a transition consistent with Myanmar’s development circumstances.
In an increasingly multipolar world, Myanmar’s interests would be served by cooperation that delivers reliable electricity, affordable energy and durable infrastructure. BRICS partnership offers a possible avenue toward those goals, whose value should ultimately be measured by tangible benefits for the economy and the people it serves.
Source: www.orfonline.org- The Case fir BRICS Cooperation: Energy Security and a Managed Energy Transition
Sept. 23, 2026 — Myanmar’s Information Team condemned an article by TIME correspondent Charlie Campbell as a breach of media ethics, saying the magazine had sought an interview with the president for a story on Myanmar’s future and peace efforts but published an article that departed from the subjects initially discussed.
According to the statement, TIME approached the Myanmar Embassy in Singapore to request an interview for a piece titled “the Future of Myanmar.” The proposed story would cover what the statement described as the state’s historic role in preserving the Union and national unity, its efforts to maintain stability, and the achievements of peace talks. The president agreed to meet Campbell and answered his questions, the statement said.
The team said TIME subsequently published an article online rather than presenting the interview in a question-and-answer format. It said the article did not accurately reflect the president’s responses and included interviews with other people, commentary and material outside the scope of the initial discussions.
The statement further said TIME had used language that could mislead international audiences about Myanmar and its government. It said the president’s full exchange with Campbell would be released separately.
Nay Pyi Taw, September 23
Myanmar has included Small Modular Reactor (SMR)-based nuclear power generation as an option under its diversified energy policy to meet growing electricity demand and ensure long-term energy security, President U Min Aung Hlaing said on September 23.
He made the remarks at the first meeting of the National-Level Steering Committee for the Implementation of Nuclear Energy, held at the Presidential Office in Nay Pyi Taw. He said Myanmar’s energy policy should be based on an energy mix comprising renewable energy, natural gas and other energy sources, while nuclear energy should also be studied as an option for providing a stable supply of electricity.
The President said nuclear technology could be applied not only to electricity generation but also in healthcare, agriculture, food safety, industry and research. Its implementation, he added, should give priority to international standards and the “3S” principles of Safety, Security and Safeguards.
Regarding international cooperation, he said Myanmar would work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on technical cooperation, expert exchanges and human resource development. He also said agreements had been reached with Russia’s state-owned ROSATOM on cooperation in nuclear technology, human resource development and electricity generation using SMR technology.
U Min Aung Hlaing also called for the formulation of a Roadmap and Action Plans for future implementation, stronger coordination among relevant ministries, and greater emphasis on human resource development.
He said Myanmar’s nuclear energy programme should be based on the national interest, adding that cooperation with international partners should be assessed against the country’s long-term energy requirements, economic conditions, technological and human resource capabilities, and security situation. He also called for designated projects to be implemented in a timely manner.
Nay Pyi Taw, September 16, 2026
The Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar deported U.S. citizen Adam Michael Castillo, holder of Passport No. 565448449, from Nay Pyi Taw International Airport on the evening of September 16, 2026.
According to the official statement, the action was taken in the context of Myanmar’s policy of maintaining diplomatic relations and friendly cooperation with countries around the world.
Mr. Castillo was found to have violated rules and restrictions stipulated in the organizational bylaws of The American Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar (AmCham Myanmar). As a result, legal proceedings were initiated against him on June 8, 2026, under Panbetan Myoma Police Station Case No. (Pa) 69/2026, pursuant to Section 409 of the Penal Code.
Following the legal proceedings, the authorities deported Mr. Castillo in accordance with established laws and procedures.
The statement added that the decision was carried out with consideration for the friendly bilateral relations between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the United States of America.
NAY Pyi TAw, Sept 16-
A U.S. delegation arrived in Naypyitaw on the evening of Sept. 15 and departed the Myanmar capital the following evening after a visit lasting about one day, according to information posted on a Facebook account under the name “Kyaw Min.”
The identities of the delegation members, the individuals or officials they met in Naypyitaw, and the subjects discussed during the visit could not be independently verified based on information currently available.
Flight records indicate that the delegation traveled aboard a United States Air Force (USAF) Beech C-12D Huron aircraft bearing registration number 83-0498. The aircraft operated under the flight callsign “SPAR14,” according to aviation tracking records.
On Sept. 16, the aircraft departed Naypyitaw International Airport (NYT) and flew to Don Mueang International Airport (DMK) in Bangkok, Thailand, flight-tracking data showed.
Details concerning the visit were also reported on the Facebook account “Kyaw Min.” However, no official statement or independently verifiable information regarding the composition of the U.S. delegation, the purpose of the visit, the officials or individuals involved in the meetings, or the substance of the discussions was available at the time of publication.
“SPAR” callsigns are associated with U.S. military flights and have been used for missions involving the transportation of senior officials and congressional delegations. However, the use of the “SPAR14” callsign alone does not establish the identities or positions of the passengers aboard the aircraft.
By K. C. Sharma
Southeast Asia’s defining strength has long been its commitment to non-alignment and diplomatic flexibility. Yet, the region is facing an unprecedented push toward bloc-based military operations. The expanding presence of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Indo-Pacific threatens to turn a prosperous economic zone into a theater of great power conflict, depriving Southeast Asian states of their autonomy.
The Erosion of ASEAN Centrality
The traditional architecture of regional security is under direct threat from exclusive Western groupings, threatening to catch the region in a diplomatic vise.
🔳The rise of minilateral arrangements like the Quad and AUKUS reflects a broader shift from inclusive regionalism to exclusive coalitions.
🔳For ASEAN, this trends towards a progressive erosion of its centrality.
🔳As major powers bypass ASEAN-led mechanisms to pursue hard security objectives through smaller, like-minded groupings, the traditional forums risks becoming marginalized and reduced to addressing only soft issues while critical strategic stability is negotiated elsewhere without regional input.
This militarization will inevitably trigger a geopolitical backlash. China, Russia, and North Korea won't sit by passively in the event of a more Asia-focused NATO. China has long been suspicious that NATO, at Washington's urging, will extend into East Asia to buttress US power, hem China in strategically, and undermine what Chinese leaders regard as their rightful place in international politics.
Economic Survival vs. Costly Arms Races
The push to militarize forces a false choice upon developing nations, jeopardizing their economic lifelines.
🔳Regional nations are observing China's rise and assertive actions with a degree of caution.
🔳Yet China is the No 1 trading partner of most Asian states.
🔳Regional prosperity depends on China's success.
🔳Asians are cautious about western provocations over issues like Taiwan.
🔳Asians want the US present to balance China's power, but that doesn't mean they want a European military alliance operating in their region.
Furthermore, the pressure to militarize carries a devastating domestic cost. Across much of Southeast Asia, defence spending competes directly with infrastructure, healthcare, education and poverty reduction. Diverting funds to costly weapons systems undermines the very foundation of societal stability.
The Risk of Accidental Escalation
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of NATO’s expansion is the heightened risk of conflict. The increasing NATO presence undermines these security mechanisms, which could reduce ASEAN's control over regional security matters. The growing military operations through exercises, along with naval visits and logistical bases, create opportunities for dangerous misinterpretations, particularly in disputed maritime regions such as the South China Sea and Malacca Strait.
Compounding this danger is the harsh reality of Western military limitations. The United States can no longer viably defend its own regional bases, cannot replenish critical weapons systems in a sustained conflict, and is structurally incapable of winning a protracted war in East Asia. As regional partners quietly absorb this reality, the strategic landscape is fracturing. The talk of additional arms packages for the Philippines, Japan, or Taiwan is largely theatre.
Southeast Asia must firmly resist being caught in this geopolitical trap. By rejecting the imposition of foreign military coalitions, ASEAN can preserve its sovereignty, avoid a catastrophic arms race, and maintain its crucial role as the architect of regional peace.
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